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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
Violence between Hindus and Muslims is a structural given of Indian society. One 
finds its traces very early in the country’s history2, a fact that can drive the analyst 
to explain the phenomenon by referring to the incompatibility of Hindu and 
Muslim cultures.3 However, those historians interested in the phenomenon have 
always emphasized the economic dimension of the rivalry between Hindus and 
Muslims, which springs from territorial conflicts or commercial competition.4 
Among sociologists and political scientists, this approach has found favour with 
many authors more or less inclined to Marxist categories.5 
                                                 
1 Christophe Jaffrelot is Director of the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales, 
Paris. 
2 See, for example, the description of Ibn Battutta dating from the 14th century (Ibn 
Battutta, Voyages d’Ibn Battuta, Paris, Anthropos (1969), p. 80). 
3 Louis Dumont is not far from a culturalist reading of this kind when evoking 
“l’hétérogénité sociale définitive des deux communautés” (see Homo Hierarchicus, Paris, 
Gallimard (1966), p. 382).  
4 See in particular, C. Bayly, “The pre-history of ‘Communalism’? Religious conflict in 
India, 1700-1800 ”, Modern Asian Studies 19 (2), 1995, pp. 190-91. 
5 See, for example, I. Ahmed, “ Political economy of communalism in contemporary 
India ”, Economic and Political Weekly, 2.6.1984, pp. 903-906 and A.A. Engineer, “The 
causes of communal riots in the post-partition period in India”, in A.A. Engineer (ed.), 
Communal riots in post-independence India, Bombay, Sangam Books, 1984, pp. 33-41. 
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The interpretation of violence between Hindus and Muslims that I have suggested 
during the last wave of riots between 1989 and 1992 is very different.6 This 
interpretation values the role of politics in two complementary aspects, the ethno-
religious ideology and the exploitation of communal issues by political parties. 
Indeed, research on communal riots in India after 1947 suggests that these riots 
largely originate from a distorted idea – ideology – of the Other; the Hindu though 
representing an overwhelming majority, often perceive of the Muslims as a ‘fifth 
column’ threatening them from within Indian society. And the Hindu nationalist 
parties, which have codified this ideological pattern, employ it for electoral means 
in the course of campaigns laying the ground for the outbreak of violence. These 
parties have, in fact, learned to mobilise Hindus against Muslims on the basis of 
real or presumed ‘sacred’ issues since the emergence of electoral politics in 
colonial times. Their goal is to provoke such kinds of riots in order to polarise the 
electorate along the religious cleavage more effectively.  
 This explanatory model of Hindu-Muslim riots has to be verified again in the 
light of the Gujarat riots of 2002. Moreover, these riots also commit us to 
reconfirm the role of the Hindu nationalist party. The latter has to be weighted even 
more heavily due to the events in Gujarat, for the party held political power in that 
State. This state of things explains the rather exceptional intensity of the Gujarat 
riots. Because, this time, communal violence was not so much a reflection of the 
common logic of communal riots in India, but rather the result of an organised 
pogrom with the approval of the State acting not only with the electoral agenda in 
mind, but also in view of a veritable ethnic cleansing. Beyond that, the intensity of 
the riots has also demonstrated that this kind of violence has triggered a feedback 
in society even among groups so far less inclined to ethnic nationalism like, for 
example, the tribals. But there is an effect of yet another political strategy at work, 
which reminds us of the ideological core of our explanatory model: the more and 
more thorough diffusion of Hindutva in reaction to a fear of Jihad. 
 
 
G O D H R A ,  2 7  F E B R U A R Y  2 0 0 2 :  A  R I O T  P R O V O K E D   
 
Gujarat has long been known for its communal violence.7 The riot in Ahmedabad 
in 1969, which left approximately 630 dead, remained the most serious riot in India 
after Partition until the Bhagalpur riot, twenty years later, which was part of the 
wave of clashes between Muslims and Hindus from the Ramjanmabhoomi 
movement set on building a Hindu temple on the Babri Masjid site in Ayodhya. 
But this same movement also brought Gujarat to the fore: throughout the 1980-
1990s, this state counted the most riot victims per inhabitant. In 1990, L.K. 
Advani's Rath Yatra sparked riots that left about 220 dead in this state. In 1992, the 
                                                 
6 Christophe Jaffrelot, “ Les émeutes entre hindous et musulmans. Essai de hiérarchisation 
des facteurs culturels, économiques et politiques ”, Cultures et Conflits, n° 5, printemps 
1992, pp. 25-53. 
7 Between 1970 and 2002, Gujarat experience, 443 Hindu-Muslim riots. 
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demolition of the Babri Masjid also set off a wave of violence that killed 325 
people, mostly Muslims. The heightening of this phenomenon in the 1990s already 
reflected nationalist Hindu activism. The clashes in 2002 must also be analyzed as 
a political phenomenon.  
Violence broke out on 27 February in Godhra, a district headquarters in eastern 
Gujarat. Fifty-seven Hindus were killed, including 25 women and 14 children, who 
were burned alive aboard the Sabarmati Express. The train was carrying back from 
Faizabad (Uttar Pradesh) nationalist Hindu activists who had travelled to Ayodhya 
to build a temple dedicated to the god Ram on the ruins of the Babri Masjid. A 
campaign to build this temple had been instigated by the Vishva Hindu Parishad 
(VHP), a key element of the Hindu nationalist movement, within the context of the 
election campaign in Uttar Pradesh where the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), another 
component of this movement, was attempting to retain power by all possible 
means. The undertaking had once again been postponed through central 
government mediation and the judges' vigilance, which had increasingly frustrated 
the kar sevaks (literally “servers-in-action”), Hindu nationalist activists who had 
come to Ayodhya to erect the temple.  
 Those who were originally from Gujarat and were returning home aboard the 
Sabarmati Express had gathered together in a few coaches. They chanted Hindu 
nationalist songs and slogans throughout the entire voyage, all the while harassing 
Muslim passengers. One family was even made to get off the train for refusing to 
utter the kar sevaks' war cry: “Jai Shri Ram!” (Glory to Lord Ram!). More abuse 
occurred at the stop in Godhra: a Muslim shopkeeper was also ordered to shout 
“Jai Shri Ram!” He refused, and was assaulted until the kar sevaks turned on a 
Muslim woman with her two daughters. One of them was forced to board the train 
before it started going again.  
 The train had hardly left the station when one of the passengers pulled the 
emergency chain. It was yanked several times, until the train came to a halt in the 
middle of a Muslim neighborhood inhabited by Ghanchis, a community from 
which many of the Godhra street vendors hail. Anywhere from 500 to 2,000 of 
them, depending on the sources, surrounded the coaches occupied by the kar 
sevaks and attacked it with stones and torches. Coach S-6 caught fire, killing 57 
people.  
The anti-Hindu riot was thus a reaction to provocation from Hindu nationalist 
activists. The aftermath of the events clearly showed that the violence reached 
unprecedented proportions precisely because of the political strategy these Hindu 
nationalists employ.  
 
FROM RIOT TO POGROM: STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE  
 
Narendra Modi, the BJP Chief Minister in Gujarat, is a former cadre member in the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) which spawned the Hindu nationalist 
movement, and where most of the VHP and BJP leaders got their start. Modi, 
known for his radical hostility toward Muslims, already on 27 February, 
orchestrated retaliation. Whereas Godhra District Collector had spent the day 
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explaining that the incident was not premeditated, Modi imposed his official 
version of the event that very evening, stating that it was a “pre-planned violent act 
of terrorism.”8 In addition, Modi called together police officials at his home and 
gave them orders not to put down the Hindus who would inevitably react to the 
Godhra attack: the “Hindu backlash” was not only foreseeable, it was legitimate.9 
And that very evening, on the government's orders, the bodies were taken to 
Ahmedabad for a post-mortem and public ceremony. The arrival of the bodies at 
the Ahmedabad station was broadcast on television, causing considerable agitation 
among the Hindus, all the more so since the bodies were exhibited covered with a 
sheet. The following day, the VHP organized the shutdown of the city (bandh) with 
the support of the BJP. This mobilization established the conditions for a Hindu 
offensive in Ahmedabad.  
But in addition to Godhra and Ahmedabad (two cities with histories steeped in 
communal strife),10 other towns in Gujarat experienced clashes they were 
unacquainted with. On the evening of 28 February, Gandhinagar, the capital of 
Gujarat, located 30 km from Ahmedabad, was the scene of Hindu-Muslim rioting 
for the first time in its history. Twenty-six towns in all were subject to curfew. 
Ahmedabad and Godhra saw the most serious clashes, with 350 and 100 victims 
respectively in early March, according to official statistics. After these two cities 
came Mehsana (50 dead ) and Sabarkantha (40 dead).  
Reviewing the sequence of events, even in a condensed version, gives an idea 
of the power of destruction that came over Gujarat during those few days. On 28 
February, in Ahmedabad, in the Naroda Gaon and Naroda Pattiya areas, an armed 
hoard of several thousand people attacked Muslim houses and shops, killing 200. 
Six other neighborhoods in the city were subject to similar attacks on a lesser scale. 
Three other districts, Vadodara, Gandhinagar and Sabarkhanta, were host to 
comparable violence. In the latter district, several settlements were the scene of 
clashes. Elsewhere, too, but to a lesser degree, the previously spared rural areas 
were involved.11 The next day, on 1 March, mainly rural districts were added to the 
list of hotspots: Panchmahals, Mehsana, Kheda, Junagadh, Banaskantha, Patan, 
Anand and Narmada. On 2 March, Bharuch and Rajkot, which had yet to be 
affected by communal violence, were hit in turn. On the 4th, riots broke out in 
Surat, a town that had seen considerable Hindu-Muslim violence in the 1990s and 
was much less affected this time.  
 
                                                 
8 Quoted by Communalism Combat, March-April 2002, vol. 8, no. 77-78, p. 12. 
9 See the report by the Concerned Citizens' Tribunal presided by Krishna Iyer. 
10 With 1,119 victims of Hindu-Muslim riots between 1950 and 1995, up to then 
Ahmedabad ranked just behind Bombay (1,137 dead) in this grim classification. It most 
likely took the lead in 2002 (See A. Varshney, Ethnic conflict and civic life. Hindus and 
Muslims in India, New Heaven/London, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 7). 
11 Hindu-Muslim riots for a long time remained basically an urban phenomenon in Gujarat 
and elsewhere: from 1950 to 1995, 80% of the victims of all the rioting in Gujarat were in 
Ahmedabad and Vadodara (A. Varshney, op. cit., p. 7).  
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P R E M E D I T A T E D  A N D  C O O R D I N A T E D  C L A S H E S   
 
The clashes in Gujarat could not have spread so quickly and taken on such 
proportions unless they had been orchestrated by well-organized actors and the 
attackers' plan had been prepared prior to the events in Godhra. The evening of 27 
February, two of Modi's ministers, Ashok Bhatt and Prabhatsingh Chauhan, along 
with 50 other Sangh Parivar officials, organized a rally in Lunawad, a village in 
Panchamahals, of which Gohad is district headquarters, to plan “reprisals.”12 As 
early as 28 February, 24 hours after the attack on the Sabarmati Express, and 
shortly after Modi stirred up the anger by repatriating the victims' bodies to 
Ahmedabad, the VHP bandh degenerated into a well-tuned orgy of violence: 
nothing was left to chance; it was a far cry from the spontaneous rioting Modi later 
described to excuse the Hindus.13 
Actually, everything went according to a military-like plan in Ahmedabad and 
elsewhere.14 The troops were perfectly disciplined and incredibly numerous: 
groups of attackers often included up to 10,000 men. These squads generally 
arrived in the Muslim neighborhoods by truckloads. They wore a basic uniform — 
the RSS khaki shorts and a saffron headband — and carried daggers and pitchforks 
as well as bottles of water to quench their thirst en route. The lists that the 
ringleaders had in hand attest to the premeditated nature of the assault: these 
indicated Muslim homes and shops, some of which bore Hindi names, thereby 
proving that investigation had actually been undertaken beforehand to ascertain the 
owner's identity. These lists — on computer print-outs — had partly been drawn up 
on the basis of voter registration lists, as a former VHP member himself explained.  
That the entire plan had been carefully organized can also be inferred from the 
assiduous use the aggressors made of cellular telephones. They apparently reported 
regularly to a central headquarters and received their instructions from this same 
center. It is not entirely impossible that these headquarters had been simply set up 
in the police stations of the towns involved, or of the state itself, because a number 
of Hindu nationalist leaders took up residence there throughout the period of 
violence. Several senior civil servants — on condition of anonymity — admitted to 
National Human Rights Commission investigators that on 28 February, the Gujarat 
Interior Minister, Gordhan Zadafira, and Health Minister Ashok Bhatt directed the 
advance of the assailants from the “City police control room” of Ahmedabad. At 
                                                 
12 See the report by the Concerned Citizens' Tribunal presided by Krishna Iyer. 
13 He even justified the most violent doings among them in these words: “The violence in 
Godhra was communal violence, the violence after that was `secular violence'.” Why did 
Modi claim the Hindu acts of vengeance were spontaneous? Because it is crucial for the 
Hindu nationalists to make people believe in the spontaneity of the masses. The VHP in 
fact published a manual to teach its activists to make planned riots appear as spontaneous 
acts of violence. 
14 The VHP president in Gujarat in fact stated that the Muslims shops in Ahmedabad were 
divided up the morning of 28 February. He added that the most active thugs in the violence 
were Waghri untouchables - which recalls the use of untouchables as real mercenaries 
during the Merut riots in the 1980s; the “payoff” came in the form of looting Muslim shops 
(rediff.com, 12 March 2002).  
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the same time, the Urban Development Minister, I.K. Jadeja, a close associate of 
Modi, had set up his headquarter in the Gujarat “State police control room” in 
Gandhinagar. All gave the police forces orders not to intervene.  
The attackers were trained to kill and had planned their criminal undertaking. 
This was obvious in the use of gas cylinders that they had had shipped to their 
attack sites. The typical scenario of this new-style violence involved looting 
Muslim shops then blowing them up with these makeshift but extremely powerful 
bombs. Not only does the course of these operations show carefully planned 
organization, but they also indicate official state support. It would be impossible to 
transport that many men (and gas cylinders) with that many trucks without the 
benefit of state logistic support. Above all, the protected nature of the clashes over 
days, weeks, and even months can only be explained by active government 
cooperation.  
This bias was tested beforehand by the Hindu nationalist activists, after their 
leaders had given them assurances: they set fire to a few automobiles in the vicinity 
of police stations to make sure their schemes could be carried out with no fear of 
punishment. This was almost always the case, given that the leaders of the party in 
power, the BJP, had quickly occupied central police headquarters. The 
administration — when it did care to act — was paralyzed. But in any event, since 
their rise to power in Gujarat, Hindu nationalists had already penetrated deep into 
the state apparatus, starting with the police. Hence the standard response, they gave 
to the Muslims who called them to their rescue : “We have no order to save you”15 
Local BJP and VHP leaders were out in the streets alongside the attackers. 
Victims of their violence gave names and descriptions about which there can be no 
mistake. On the basis of these, the editor-in-chief of Communalism Combat, a 
secularist publication, revealed that charges had been filed against a BJP MP and 
four city councilors.16 No tangible effective action was taken.  
An indication that the Modi government wanted to see the clashes last, the 
army, which was already in the vicinity on 1 March — 12 columns with 600 men 
were stationed at the time in Ahmedabad and other hotspots in Gujarat — was not 
sent to the places where it could have been the most useful. Aside from a few “flag 
marches,” it had to settle for remaining on stand-by under the pretense, for 
instance, that no “official” was available to accompany the troop.  
The state partiality also appeared blatantly in the treatment inflicted on the 
Muslims who took shelter in refugee camps. At the height of the violence, there 
were as many as 125,000 refugees in these camps. Officially, they still numbered 
87,000 in April 2002, 66,000 of them in Ahmedabad alone. In three months, the 
government registered the return home of 73,500 refugees (52,500 in Ahmedabad) 
to pretend that law and order had been restored and that elections could be held. In 
any case, the authorities never took the necessary steps to help the refugees: most 
of the aid came from Muslim NGOs.  
                                                 
15 See, Human Rights Watch, “India, ‘We have no order to save you’, state participation 
and complicity in communal violence in Gujarat”, 14 (3), April 2003. 
16 Letter of Teesta Setalvad to Election Commission of India, 26 July 2002. E-mail 
communication. 
 
CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT  7 
C L A S H E S  I N  R U R A L  G U J A R A T :  T H E  C O M M U N A L I Z A T I O N  
O F  T R I B A L  Z O N E S   
 
Riots between Hindus and Muslims have traditionally been an urban phenomenon. 
This was all the more true in Gujarat where there are, moreover, proportionally 
more Muslims in cities than in the countryside (the share of Muslims living in rural 
areas is only 42 % in Gujarat compared to 65% for the national average). Yet the 
violence in 2002 spread to the villages and so, in many cases, to villages where 
very few Muslims resided. The districts of Mehsana and Gandhinagar, for instance, 
which have only 6.6 % and 2.9 % Muslim residents respectively according to the 
2001 census, were heavily affected, even in the rural areas.  
This singularity can be largely explained by the fact that the small Muslim 
minority is made up mainly of shopkeepers and moneylenders: unlike their 
coreligionists in the rest of India, the Gujarat Muslims have a small, fairly 
successful economic elite. This social class is primarily from the Bohra, Khoja and 
Memon castes. In many villages, these groups own several businesses and are the 
main moneylenders (sahukar), to whom peasants become indebted, sometimes to 
pay their daughter's dowry, sometimes to buy seed for the year. These Muslims 
were one of the attackers' prime targets. Often this target was pinpointed by Hindu 
nationalist activists who had come from the city. They exploited the peasants' 
resentment toward this small economic elite; they also lured them with the appeal 
of financial reward in the form of looting shops. This has led Dipankar Gupta to 
interpret the spread of rioting to rural areas in Gujarat as due mainly to economic 
reasons.17 The study conducted by Bela Bhatia in Sabarkantha partly corroborates 
this analysis. The author in fact observes a shift in the violence from cities to 
villages between 28 February - date when the cities of Khedbrahma and Bhilodas 
were hit — and the evening of 1 March, when it spread to the villages.18 The agents 
of this spread were Hindu nationalist activists from the city or nearby towns. These 
tolas (groups), whose members were wearing the saffron-colored headband and 
chanting anti-Muslim slogans, entered the villages on tractors or in jeeps. Most of 
them were from the Patel caste – a caste of landed peasants who had prospered in 
farming before going into trade and industry to such an extent that the urban 
economy in Gujarat today is as much in their hands as those of the traditional 
merchant castes in the region. These assailants proved to be perfectly organized: 
divided into three groups, todwavalla (those who were destroying), lootwavalla 
(those who were looting) and baadwavalla (those who were burning), they went 
through several villages. In all, 2,161 houses, 1,461 shops, 71 workshops and 
factories and 38 hotels were looted and entirely or partly destroyed in the district of 
Sabarkantha. In addition, 45 places of worship underwent the same fate, which 
suggests that beyond the purely economic aspect, the violence reflected 
xenophobic feelings. In fact, one of the most repeated slogans was: “Muslai ne 
                                                 
17 D. Gupta, “The Limits of Tolerance: Prospects of Secularism in India After Gujarat,” 
Prem Bathia Memorial Lecture, 11 August 2002. 
18 B. Bhatia, “A Step Back in Sabarkantha”, Seminar n° 513 (http://www.india-
seminar.com/2002/513/513%20bela%20bhatia.htm). 
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gaam ma thi kado” (soiRun the Muslims out of the village), a slogan chanted by 
local villagers as well as activists from outside the village.  
Altogether, over 1,200 villages were affected, particularly in the districts of 
Panchmahals, Mehsana, Sabarkantaha, Bharuch, Bhavnagar and Vadodara. In this 
latter district, the army had to be called in on 5 March. 2,500 Muslims from 22 
different villages were evacuated and moved to refugee camps. These villages no 
longer had a single Muslim according to the District Magistrate.19 
But the most surprising development still, lies elsewhere: of the villages 
involved, many of them were in the tribal zone, the eastern “tribal belt,” bordering 
Madhya Pradesh, from Ambaji to Narmada. Never before had there been such 
massive participation of indigenous peoples (adivasis) in the anti-Muslim riots 
alongside Hindu nationalist activists.  
This phenomenon has usually been interpreted by local observers in the same 
way villager involvement has, the adivasis being a subgroup of them. Bela Bhatia's 
study in Sabarkhanta – a district where tribes make up 17 % of the population – 
thus leads her to conclude that the adivasis “were used by upper caste and class 
Hindus in their program against the Muslims.” Testimonies Bhatia gathered in the 
field among Muslim survivors even made excuses for the aggressions the adivasis 
perpetrated, considering that it was not surprising to see them loot Bohra, Khoja 
and Memon shops, given the drought they had long suffered and the atmosphere 
created by the riot.  
 
E L E C T O R A L  V I O L E N C E   
 
The Modi government’s involvement in Hindu/Muslim violence – a fact that 
largely explains its exceptional scope – is part of an unavowed but easily 
reconstructed political strategy. His party, the BJP, and the Hindu nationalist 
movement on the whole, honed this strategy between 1989 and 1991 when their 
activists worked at provoking anti-Muslim riots as election time approached. This 
violence in effect polarises society along a religious line of cleavage, which 
generally leads the Hindu majority, with a heightened sense of Hindu identity, to 
vote more in favor of the BJP. This explains the correlation between the election 
calendar and the cycle of riots. Steven Wilkinson has thus shown that “[…] both 
riots and deaths do tend to cluster in the months before elections, and then drop off 
sharply in the months after an election is held.”20 
This analysis began to lose some of its relevance in 1993 when the BJP was 
defeated in regional elections in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Delhi precisely due 
to excessive violence: too many riots tend to cancel out the impact of what is 
gained in terms of votes, because even the Hindu majority suffers from the anarchy 
resulting from repeated violence and curfews. Shopkeepers and industrialists —
from which the BJP traditionally draws its support— are particularly at risk when 
                                                 
19 These figures come from a confidential report of the National Human Rights 
Commission, following its March 2002 investigation in Gujarat. 
20 Steven I. Wilkinson, “Froids calculs et foules déchaînées. Les émeutes 
intercommunautaires en Inde,” Critique Internationale, no. 6, Winter 2000, p. 132. 
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violence is heavy and drawn out. The violence of the 1992-93 riots following the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 exceeded 
anything India had yet experienced since Partition. Afterward, the BJP was also 
dissuaded from using riots as a strategy by the mere fact of its rise to power in New 
Delhi in 1998, since it was henceforth responsible for public order and it had to 
accommodate coalition partners which did not share its ideology. But this new rule 
of conduct was challenged by many party activists and cadres as the BJP was 
declining. With the end of the 1990s, the party in fact started losing local and state 
elections one after the other. The most radical members then suggested doing away 
with the moderate official line and returning to a strategy of ethno-religious 
mobilisation, of which communal violence was a key element, so as to win the 
elections again.  
In Gujarat, elections were not scheduled until 2003, but the rioters' high level 
of organization proves that the Hindu nationalist movement was already preparing 
for this date with strongarm tactics. Nothing could be more logical. First, the state 
was accustomed to pre-election riots (between 1987 and 1991, 40 % of the 106 
Hindu-Muslim riots that afflicted Gujarat took place at election time)21. Second, the 
BJP had stacked up repeated electoral setbacks here as elsewhere: in December 
2000, the party lost two cities in municipal elections (one of which was 
Ahmedabad) out of the six it had held up to then, and above all, it was 
marginalized in nearly all the district committees (a sort of county council) whose 
elected officers were being renewed at the same time.  
Modi thus used Godhra as an opportunity to unleash violence that he hoped to 
capitalize on during early elections. It was to provoke early elections that he 
decided to recommend that the governor —S.S. Bhandari, another RSS activist—
dissolve the Gujarat assembly on 19 July. At the same time, he resigned as Chief 
Minister, while remaining at the helm to handle routine proceedings. And he 
immediately set about calling for early elections. These tactics were all the more 
shocking since the violence had far from subsided everywhere. Several months 
after the paroxysm of late February – early March, skirmishes were still claiming 
victims: on 21 April, the death of a policeman in Ahmedabad led to acts of 
vengeance – six Muslims were shot down by men in uniform. On 20 July, the day 
after the assembly was dissolved, two people were killed and 14 others wounded 
by stone-throwing and police gunfire, again in Ahmedabad. On 13 August, still in 
Ahmedabad, sporadic clashes wounded three. On 17 September, violence again 
broke out in Borsad (a small town in Anand district) after a Muslim motorcyclist 
accidentally hit a young Hindu. Shops owned by Muslims were torched in 
retribution. The riot left one dead and 13 wounded. The town had to be put under 
curfew. On 29 September, a makeshift bomb exploded, wounding one person in 
Godhra. On 2 October, the festivities organized to celebrate Gandhi's birthday 
(Gandhi Jayanti) gave rise to violence in Bhavnagar (where the police had to open 
fire to disperse the attackers), Vadodara and Piplod, where police forces had to use 
teargas. On 6 October, the police again had to intervene, leaving two wounded, 
after Hindu-Muslim clashes. On 15 October, a makeshift bomb exploded in a bus 
                                                 
21 K.M. Chenoy et al., Gujarat Carnage 2002. A Report to the Nation, April 2002, p. 19. 
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in Godhra, wounding six. The following day another bomb went off in a bus in 
Lunawada (Panchmahals district), wounding two people.  
 In such conditions, James Michael Lyngdoh, Chief Election Commissioner, 
who visited 12 of the state's districts between 31 July and 4 August, was reluctant 
to organise any poll, especially since many voters, a vast majority of them 
Muslims, were still living far from their homes in refugee camps. So Modi and the 
BJP strove to demonstrate that calm had been restored, leading them first to 
hurriedly close the refugee camps or lower the number of their occupants reported 
in official statistics, and argue that in accordance with article 174 of the 
Constitution, the time between dissolving the assembly and holding new elections 
could not exceed six months. National BJP leaders – starting with deputy prime 
minister L.K. Advani – joined in the call for early elections. Given the objections 
of the Election Commission, which preferred that President's Rule be declared 
because the election could not be organized under proper conditions and because, 
in this case, article 174 did not apply, the BJP brought the case before the Supreme 
Court. The Court refused to express an opinion, referring to the Election 
Commission decisions. In early November, the Commission set a date for the 
elections to begin on 12 December.  
On 8 September, Modi relaunched the campaign he had started in the 
immediate aftermath of the violence, in preparation for the elections. He then 
undertook a tour of the state that was highly reminiscent of L.K. Advani's Rath 
Yatra in 1990. Like this huge political pilgrimage that left from the Somnath 
Temple in Gujarat, Modi's Gaurav Yatra left from the Bhathiji Maharaj Temple in 
Phagval (Kheda district). This tour instantly met with great popular success. On 9 
September in Himmatnagar, for instance a huge crowd gathered along the roadside 
and at the place where Modi was to hold his rally, which he did not even reach 
until 2 a.m.  
Throughout this entire tour, Modi's speeches were peppered with anti-Muslim 
references. In Becharaji, he stooped to portraying Muslims as abiding by the motto 
“hum paanch, hamare pachchees” (We are five – allusion to Muslim polygamy – 
we will have fifty children – an open criticism of the high Muslim birth rate that 
many Hindus fear). The VHP distributed thousands of copies of this speech. The 
BJP and the VHP carefully divided up the work: Modi was bound by the Election 
Commission's model code of conduct obliging political parties to maintain a certain 
reserve, whereas Togadia, VHP international general secretary, used all means at 
his disposal: he held 220 rallies during the election campaign, taking “jehadi 
terrorism” as his main target. The VHP not only handed out CDs describing the 
massacre in Godhra, but also had T-shirts printed up stating: “We will not allow 
our area to be converted into Godhra.”  
The Election Commission was obliged to react. It demanded that Modi take the 
necessary steps to end the Vijay Yatra – Victory Pilgrimage – that the VHP had 
begun in mid-November. Modi had Togadia and 42 other VHP militants arrested 
when their movement set off on 17 November from a temple in Ahmedabad. The 
VHP initiated another movement called “Jan Jagaran,” a mass awareness 
campaign. The government settled for denying Togadia access to Panchmahals of 
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which Godhra is the district headquarters. This gesticulating fooled no one: Modi 
and Togadia had divided up the work for an extremely aggressive election 
campaign.  
Not only was the BJP campaign rife with anti-Muslim references, but it was 
also based on an obvious equation between Islam and terrorism. One of the BJP's 
television commercials began with the sound of a train pulling into a station, 
followed by the clamor of riots and women's screams before the ringing of temple 
bells was covered by the din of automatic rifle fire. After which, Modi's reassuring 
countenance appeared, hinting to voters that only he could protect Gujarat from 
such violence. The BJP Election Manifesto pledged to train Gujarat youth, 
particularly those living on the Pakistani border, in anti-terrorist tactics. Self-
defense militias would be set up in border towns where large numbers of retired 
servicemen would be brought in. Special gun permits would be issued to the 
lifeblood of a nation under siege. Not only to Modi did Muslim mean terrorist, but 
the equation went a step further by establishing an equivalence between “Muslim” 
and “Pakistani” as well: any adept of Islam was potentially a fifth column 
Pakistani. This explains the attention devoted to attacks against Musharraf in 
Modi's election campaign. He for instance declared at a rally in Ahmedabad on 1 
October – for “Anti-Terrorism Day”: “India will continue to refer to him as Mian 
Musharraf. If the pseudo-secularists don't like it, they can go and lick Musharraf's 
boots. I dare him to send more terrorists to Gujarat, we are prepared this time. Arey 
mian, taari goli khuti jashe (Mian, your bullets will run out).”  
Modi spared no efforts throughout his campaign to spread this anti-Muslim 
security-based obsession: He covered 4,200 kilometers during the Gaurav Yatra, 
which began on 8 September and ended at the same time as the election campaign. 
He held 400 rallies in 146 of the state's 182 constituencies. He did what he could to 
discredit his main opponent, the Congress, accusing it in particular of being the 
“mother of terrorism” during a rally in Bhuj on 4 December. The outcome was in 
his favor: 63% of the registered voters took the trouble to go out and vote and the 
BJP garnered a majority of seats for the third time in a row (unprecedented 
elsewhere in India) with a record score of 126 seats out of 182 (compared to 117 in 
1998) and about 50% of the votes cast. As for the Congress, it won only 51 seats (2 
fewer than in 1998 despite a slight increase in votes, 38% compared to 34%). Only 
the violence made this landslide possible: the BJP won all the seats in the three 
districts most heavily affected by this violence, Panchmahals, Dahod and 
Vadodara. This is what allowed it to transcend caste cleavages and attract the 
Hindu masses: an exit-poll mentioned for instance that while 76% of the upper 
castes and 82% of the Patels voted for the BJP, OBC castes supported this party to 
– between 54 to 61% according to the jati22. Another survey showed that 59% of 
the respondents did not wish to have someone from another community as a 
neighbor, indicating just how deep the divide is and calling forth explanations other 
than mere electoral tactics on the part of politicians23.  
                                                 
22 S. Kumar, « Gujarat Assembly elections 2002. Analysing the verdict”, Economic and 
Political Weekly, 25 (January 2003, p. 275). 
23 India Today, 16 December 2002, p. 27.  
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T H E  C O M M U N A L I S A T I O N  O F  A  P O L I T I C A L  S O C I E T Y  A N D  
T H E  J E H A D  S Y N D R O M E   
 
The political strategy of a movement solidly entrenched in the state apparatus and 
desperate for electoral gains is not enough to explain the scope and intensity of the 
violence in Gujarat. These methods must be replaced in a broader context: that of a 
reactivation of the Hindu majority's inferiority complex caused by the 11 
September syndrome, and, more generally speaking, that of the communalisation 
of the state of Gujarat and its society.  
Since the 1990s, Gujarat has become the main stronghold of Hindu nationalists, 
to such an extent that today it is one of the states where the BJP has remained in 
power the longest, a situation which enabled the party to reshape the 
administration. One of the BJP government's favorite targets was the police. 
Muslim police officers have systematically been barred from executive positions. 
Of the 65 “IPS Officers” (Indian Police Service) on active duty in the state in 2002, 
only one of them still fulfilled such a role as Deputy Superintendent of Police. All 
the others had been transferred to railway surveillance, organisation of computer 
training programme, etc.24 At the same time, a vast number of Hindu nationalist 
activists and sympathisers were recruited by the Gujarat  Home Guards, a form of 
municipal police: 12,000 of its members belong to the movement .  
In addition to the police, the state machinery has been infiltrated by Hindu 
nationalists and is under BJP influence. This explains that, during the outbreak of 
violence, the rioters had access to documents that could only come from the state 
administration. They were thus able to identify, and torch, a shop in Ahmedabad 
that did not have a Muslim name but of which 10% of the capital was owned by a 
Muslim, as well as a factory owned by a Hindu who had just secured a contract in 
the Middle East. The aggressors could not have identified these targets without 
documents supplied by the administration.  
Hindu nationalist control over the state apparatus is a determining factor in 
explaining the violence in Gujarat, but the collective psychology is an equally 
significant variable: the society itself is profoundly steeped in Hindutva ideology.  
 
THE NEW DOMINANT IDEOLOGY: HINDUTVA AGAINST JEHAD  
 
In August 2002, a survey conducted among a sample of 17,776 citizens spread over 
98 parliamentary constituencies showed that for a relative but nearly absolute 
majority of respondents, the Gujarat riots were not due to the state government or 
Hindu nationalists or even — the most plausible cause— to local rabble-rousers, 
but to “Muslim fundamentalists” and Muslims aggressors from Godhra (29% and 
20 % of the answers respectively).25 Moreover, many of the respondents rated 
Modi highly, ranking him in second place among regional chief ministers in terms 
                                                 
24 Communalism Combat, n° 77-78, op. cit., p. 119. 
25 India Today, 26 August 2002, p. 33. 
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of popularity, with 45 % favorable opinions (compared to 22 % six months earlier 
in a similar survey).26 
The notion that the Hindus were in a position of self-defence and that Islamism 
was the guilty party can be explained by the post-September 11 context and 
nationalist Hindu propaganda that found a foothold in the attacks on New York and 
Washington. Added to these attacks are those that affected India directly, in 
Kashmir of course, but also in New Delhi where, on 13 December 2001, a suicide 
commando gained entry to the Lok Sabha, killing 15 people.  
These attacks reactivated the feeling of vulnerability Hindus have evidenced 
toward Muslims  periodically throughout the 20th century27: in the 1920s, the 
Khilafat movement gave rise to the first Indian Muslim show of pan-Islamism and 
in return triggered the creation of the RSS during a series of communal riots; in the 
1980s, Islamic proselytism, which appeared in a more fundamentalist light since 
the Iranian revolution, fuelled a Hindu nationalist counter-mobilization — which 
ended up focalizing on the Ayodhya incident —, and several riots; in 2002, the 
terrorist attacks of 2001 similarly reactivated a majority inferiority complex on the 
part of certain Hindus in Gujarat. A tract distributed during the riots opened with 
this characteristic assertion: “Today the minority community is trying to crush the 
majority community.”28 Another declaration, made by the Bajrang Dal (the VHP's 
paramilitary branch), began the same way: “50 years after independence it appears 
that Hindus are second [class] citizens of this country. Religious conversions, 
infiltration terrorism and bomb blasts have surrounded Hindustan.” This feeling of 
insecurity is justified a little further on by designating a culprit: “Jehad is being 
carried out in order to establish an Islamic state in Hindustan.” 29 A VHP tract 
distributed in Ahmedabad goes into detail on this point:  
“America found Laden alone too much whereas we have in our lanes 
and by-lanes thousands of Laden […] and two lakhs [200 000] mullah-
maulvis who poison one lakh [100 000] madrassas and mosques day 
and night with terrorist activities. Organisations like SIMI [a Muslim 
student union], Lashkar-e-Toiba [a paramilitary Islamist movement 
active in Kashmir and other places in India] and ISI [the Pakistani 
secret service] with the support and help of Pakistan, are carrying on 
terrorist activities. They train lakhs of terrorists in thousands of 
institutions. They have formed an army of single, unemployed Muslim 
youth of India by paying high salaries. 
The terrorist and traitorious Muslims of this country get weapons from 
more than 50 Muslim nations to carry out their religious war. They are 
supplied with AK-56 and AK-47 rifles, automatic machine guns, small 
canons, rocket launchers and several kilos of RDX […]. When 
Pakistan attacks India, the Muslims living here will revolt”.
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 42. 
27 For more details, see C. Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 
1920s to the 1990s, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996. 
28 Quoted in Communalism Combat, op. cit., p. 136. 
29 Communalism Combat, op. cit., p. 137. 
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Which led Pravin Togadia to clip: “What is happening in Gujarat is not communal 
riots but people's answer to Islamic Jehad.”30 A leaflet distributed by Bajrang Dal 
activists during the Gujarat riots went one step further since it requested the Hindus 
to “reply in the same language that is used for Jehad”. 
This strategy of stigmatising and imitating the Other, who, by its assumed 
strength, represented a danger to the Hindus has been the brand mark of Hindu 
nationalism since its inception31. For long it fuelled an ethnic nationalism that did 
not preclude community cohabitation: Muslims were required to pledge allegiance 
to the majoritarian Hindu culture, even publicly assimilate it, although they could 
continue to practice their religion in private. But a new juncture was arrived at in 
2002 in Gujarat. From then on, the nationalist Hindu discourse openly advocated 
elimination of the Muslims.  
 
T O W A R D  E T H N I C  C L E A N S I N G :  S A D I S M  A N D  S A V A G E R Y   
 
Over and above the geographic and social extent of the violence, the intensity and 
savagery of the rioting of Gujarat is what was most striking. The countless 
accounts gathered by spontaneous NGO investigations and more official inquiries 
all concur: never has Hindu-Muslim violence reached such extremes in both the 
systematic nature and duration. This analysis could leave things at that and drape a 
veil of discretion over these unbearable scenes, but instead of shying away from 
this violence, it must be told. Putting a damper on the survivors' accounts would 
boil down to denying what for some was their last wish: to recount the 
unspeakable. What happened? Entire families were electrocuted in their houses, 
which were first flooded by the murderers. Children were forced to drink kerosene 
before a match was set to their mouths. Foetuses were cut from the bellies of 
pregnant women and held up to see. Women, again, were gang raped before being 
mutilated and burned alive before their children's eyes. No one was safe. Not even 
former Ahmedabad MP, Ahsan Jafri, a Muslim of the Congress Party. Holed up in 
his home, he repeatedly called the police for help as the hoards besieging him 
continued to grow. Dragged outside and delivered up to public condemnation, he 
was covered with wax and burned alive along with his brother-in-law, the latter's 
wife and their two sons.  
Women were the primary targets of the rioters. For example: in the mass grave 
dug by the Naroda Padiya victims in Ahmedabad, 46 of the 96 bodies buried there 
were women. Never had communal violence reached such heights of sexual 
cruelty. Among the Hindus, it harks back to an ancient obsession: Muslims have 
always appeared more virile to them, partly because of their diet (meat-eating) and 
their ritual animal sacrifices. Hindu women themselves tend to see Muslims as 
threats. According to Nonica Datta, “The imaginary suspicion of the Muslim as an 
aggressor and a sexual predator continues to haunt the Hindu nationalist's 
                                                 
30 Asian Age (Delhi edition), 2 April 2002. 
31 C. Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist movement, op. cit. 
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psyche,”32 including that of women who sympathize with this ideology. The 
widespread practice of gang rape in the course of clashes in Gujarat no doubt 
reflects a desire to equal and even surpass Muslims in the sex act. But there is 
much more than that. First, the desire to dishonor and destroy an entire community 
by raping and torturing its women, which of course also aims to destroy their 
reproductive capacity33 - a method akin to the rationale of ethnic cleansing.  
Another tract distributed during the riots of Gujarat, bearing the title “Jehad” 
and written in Gujarati in the form of a poem is most edifying in this respect:34 
 
“The people of Baroda and Ahmedabad have gone berserk 
Narendra Modi you have fucked the mother of miyas 
[derogatory term for Muslims] 
 
The volcano which was inactive for years has erupted 
It has burnt the arse of miyas and made them dance nude 
 
We have untied the penises which were tied till now 
Without castor oil in the arse we have made them cry 
 
Those who call religious war, violence, are all fuckers 
We have widened the tight vaginas of the `bibis' 
[term referring to married Muslim women] 
 
Now even the adivasis have realised what Hinduism is 
They have shot their arrow in the arse of mullahs 
 
Wake up Hindus there are still miyas left alive around you 
Learn from Panwad village [a village in Panchmahals district that was 
the scene of serious rioting] where their mother was fucked 
 
She was fucked standing while she kept shouting 
 She enjoyed the uncircumcised penis 
 
With a Hindu government the Hindu have to power to annihilate miyas 
Kick them in the arse to drive them out of not only villages and cities 
but also the country. 
 
The violence in Gujarat, due to its very geographic scope and unbearable intensity, 
in fact marks the first example of ethnic cleansing targeting Muslims since India's 
Partition in 1947: the aim here was not only to loot and destroy private 
                                                 
32 N. Datta, “On the Anti-Muslim Ethos of Hindu Women in Gujarat,” Muslim India, n° 
237, Sept. 2002, p. 408. 
33 T. Sarkar, “Semiotics of Terror. Muslim-Children and Women in Hindu Rashtra,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, 13 July 2002, pp. 2872-2876. 
34 Ibid. 
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property, even if such events also took place, but indeed to murder and run off 
those perceived as intruders. In Sabarkantha, Hindus in Khetbrahma, the district 
headquarters, after having emptied the place of its Muslim inhabitants, wrote on a 
sign at the entrance to the town: “Muslims not allowed.”35 
 
A tract distributed in Gujarat during the riots says it plainly:  
 
“We do not want to leave a single Muslim alive in Gujarat. […] 
Annihilate Muslims from Bharat […] when there were kings, the 
Muslim kings forced Hindu brethren to convert and then committed 
atrocities against them. And this will continue to happen till Muslims 
are not exterminated […]. Now the Hindus of the villages should join 
the Hindus of the cities and complete the work of annihilation of 
Muslims”.36 
  
 This obsessive desire to eradicate Islam from India also explains the many 
attacks against Muslim places of worship. Though underestimated, the official 
figures regarding the casualties of the Gujarat riots and these destructions provide 
some valuable indications: between 27 February and 1 April, the official number of 
Muslim victims was 536 (67 of which were killed by the police) and Hindus, 95 
(73 of which were killed by the police); the number of Muslim wounded was 
1,143, Hindus, 529. (These figures are considerably lower than those published by 
Muslim India, which reports the total number killed in Gujarat as 1,071 and 
wounded, 1,973).37 In fact, the total number of casualties was most certainly over 
2,000 dead. As for places of Muslim Culture, they were attacked at least as 
repeatedly as Muslim shops, an indication that these symbolic targets were also of 
major importance. Altogether, 527 mosques, madrassas, cemeteries and other 
dargahs were damaged or destroyed.38 Most places of worship that were 
demolished were “replaced” by a statue of Hanuman and a saffron-colored flag.  
  
 The very fact that communal violence in Gujarat acquired the character of 
ethnic cleansing forces us to resort to explanations other than the instrumentalist 
one : the Hindu activists were not only trying to polarise the society according to a 
religious live of cleavage ; their actions were over determined by an obsessive fear 
of the Muslim Other and an incontrollable desire to annihilate Islam in India. The 
systematic dimension of the pogroms is an indication of the unprecedented 
responsiveness of society to this deep rooted xenophobia. In a way, the 
pervasiveness of this feeling was evident from the incredible passivity of all actors 
in the public sphere, with the exception of a few NGOs and newspapers: the debate 
organized at the Lok Sabha shows to what extent anti-Muslim violence has become 
                                                 
35 K. Balagopal, “Reflections on ‘Gujarat Pradesh’ of ‘Hindu Rashtra’,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 1 June 2002, p. 2119. 
36 Ibid., p. 135. 
37 Muslim India, no. 235, July 2002, p. 305. 
38 Ibid., p. 305.  
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part of everyday life and how much the political class has become accustomed, or 
even sympathetic, to this fact. Even BJP allies (such as the Telugu Desam Party) 
which were sworn secularists and counted Muslims among their electoral 
supporters protested as a matter of form. It is mainly for this reason that one can 
agree with Ashis Nandy's statement that “The Gujarat riots mark the beginning of 
a new phase in Indian politics.”39 This is the demise of a culture of relative 
tolerance. The violence in Gujarat reflects the dissemination of hatred of the Other 
that had never before reached such intensity – ethnic cleansing – or had ever been 
so widespread – extending even into the tribal areas, a place to test these assertions. 
 
THE MILITANT HINDUIZATION OF THE ADIVASIS  
 
The interpretation is a limited one that views the riots as spreading to the tribal 
zones only because Hindu nationalist activists from the city exploited the adivasis 
by luring an impoverished community jealous of Muslim merchants' wealth with 
the mirage of looting their riches. Such an analysis disregards how the adivasis 
appropriated the riots. If, at the start, the violence came from the outside, exported, 
so to speak, by city dwelling activists, the adivasis devised their own version of it. 
This process was particularly obvious in the first tribal village in Gujarat to be 
affected, Tejgadh, in the district of Panchmahals. There again, the first shops were 
torched by outsiders, but “once the first attack was over, other villagers joined in 
on their own with no further need for instigation and the looting continued,” writes 
Ganesh Devy, who observed the riots in the field for the most part.40 To Devy, 
from that point on it was clear that rioting “was not included in the master plan of 
violence.” It became “leisurely”: one or two shops were torched every day. Twelve 
days after the outbreak of violence, one house was burned down, then another the 
next day, and another the day after: “It was cold-bloodedness in slow-time. This 
ritual quality was a clear indication that at this end of the Gujarat riots, the theme 
of communalism was taking a back seat, having been taken over by the norms of 
tribal culture”. This process of tribal takeover was even more clearly illustrated in 
Panwad, a village 30 kilometers from Tejgadh where about 200 adivasis took part 
in the violence, armed with their ceremonial bows and arrows.  
Although Devy is convincing when he temporizes the importance of 
mechanisms simply instrumentalizing the adivasis, his emphasis on the influence 
of visible marks of tribal culture during the violence poses a problem. Outer signs 
of culture, such as bows and arrows, are not enough to make the violence the 
expression of that culture. Actually, the spontaneous involvement of the adivasis in 
the rioting reflects the Hinduization of their culture under the influence of a 
campaign led by the RSS, VHP, BJP and especially the Vanavasi Seva Sangh 
(Vanavasi Service Association).  
 This organization is one of the regional branches of the Vanavasi Kalyan 
Ashram created in 1952. The very name of this “ashram” for the organization of 
                                                 
39 A. Nandy, “Obituary of a Culture,” http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/513. 
40 G. Devy, “Tribal voice and violence,” Seminar, http://www.india-seminar. 
Com/2002/513. 
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“forest (vana) dwellers” translates both the vision that Hindu nationalists have of 
tribals and the strategy they have developed towards them. Hindu nationalists refer 
to tribals as “those who live in the forest” (vanavasis) rather than “those who were 
there first” (adivasis), simply because to them, “first” among the people of India 
can only be Hindus. But the vanavasis are nevertheless a target group, for the 
Hindu nationalists are determined to increase their numbers in proportion to their 
true enemies, the Muslims and the Christians.  
They first sought to pit tribals against Christians to counter the latter's 
evangelizing efforts of these animist tribes, which had met with a degree of success 
since the 19th century: the conversion rate of tribals to Christianity was particularly 
high in the Chhattisgarh tribal belt where the RSS set up the Vanavasi Kalyan 
Ashram in 1952. Its strategy of gaining access to the tribes was simply to imitate 
the Christian missionaries' approach, which owed its popularity to its social work, 
most commonly in the form of free schooling and access to medical care by 
opening dispensaries. The VKA duplicated this technique by attempting to 
inculcate nationalist Hindu ideology in schools it opened in Chhattisgarh and later 
elsewhere. The organization in fact set up branches in nearly all states in India over 
the years, a development confirmed by the name change to Bharatiya Vanavasi 
Kalyan Ashram in 1977.  
 In Gujarat, this movement was known as Vanavasi Seva Sangh (Vanavasis 
Service Association). The name well reflects its primary vocation: social work. 
There, as in other places, the VSS strove to attract tribals by duplicating the 
missionaries' charity strategies, at the same time stigmatizing Christians all the 
better to Hinduize them. Their most ordinary form of Hinduization involved free 
distribution of statuettes of Lord Ganesh, to encourage the tribals to worship him. 
Another, more conflictual strategy was to build temples devoted to Hanuman.  
In the end, Devy is obliged to remark that “the VSS and the BJP have achieved 
a measure of success in providing the tribals a political agenda of hatred…” So 
tribal culture has indeed been altered under the influence of Hindu nationalist 
propaganda. D. Gupta also underscores the receptivity of certain Bhils to Hindu 
nationalists ideas in the districts of Panchmahals and Sabarkantha, through 
propaganda from the RSS and its sister organizations. As a matter of fact, other 
tribes refer to these tribals somewhat ironically as “Ramayana Bhils,” a name 
coined from the great classic in Hindu literature, the Ramayana.  
The last communal violence is bound to accentuate this trend, not only because 
Muslims – from whom tribals used to borrow funds – do not trust Adivasis as 
much as before, but also because these Adivasis have realised that they could draw 
dividends from riots in terms of looting and exerting power41. For Lobo, the 
Adivasis are even more attracted to Hindutva than before, and their culture has 
been irreversibly affected. Indeed, more than one third of the Scheduled Tribes 
have voted for the BJP during the Gujarat election according to the CSDS exit poll.
                                                 
41 N. Lobo, «Adivasis, Hindutva and Post-Godhra Riots in Gujarat » Economic and 
Political Weekly, 30, Nov. 2002, p. 4848. 
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C O N C L U S I O N :  T H E  S P I R A L  O F  V I O L E N C E   
 
If Hindu nationalist propaganda prospers, as we believe it does, on the foundation 
of an increasingly widespread Hindu sense of insecurity, the rise in Islamic attacks 
is in danger of rekindling Hindu activism and fuelling a literally infernal spiral of 
which the Muslims will ultimately be the victims.  
 The violence in Gujarat has already put the Muslims in this state in an 
unbearable situation. No riot had yet equalled this pogrom, either in the number of 
victims or the savagery of the violence; no government had to this extent sided 
with the assailants — to the point of becoming an aggressor itself; no 
administration, from the bureaucracy to the police, had ever shown such open 
complicity with the attackers. Who can the Muslims turn to? The media? The 
English language press – whether it is national or regional — demonstrated its 
support and criticized the abuses, but the Gujarati press continually fanned the fire. 
For instance, on 1 March the daily newspaper Sandesh published an entirely 
fabricated story claiming that two Hindu women in Godhra travelling on the same 
train as the kar sevaks had been attacked by Muslims, raped, mutilated, then 
murdered.42 The story proved to be unfounded.  
 Alone and traumatized, the Muslim community became entrenched in camps 
forming ghettos and continued to be harassed by the police after the riots. When 
Nivedita Menon came to Ahmedabad from Delhi, like so many other human rights 
and minority rights activists, she recounted that in June, “every day the police 
would raid Juhapura, the Muslim ghetto, to try to round up `suspects', they would 
be resisted by the residents, there would be police firing, and the papers were full 
of front-page photographs of `Muslim mob marching towards Juhapura police 
station'. The photograph clearly showed an unarmed, peacefully marching 
demonstration.”43 And Menon added: “Every Hindu knows full well that what was 
perpetrated there is beyond human endurance. They have looked into the void - 
will there not come a moment when the void will look back?”44 
 The moment of “Muslim backlash” finally arrived in September. On the 23rd, a 
makeshift bomb hidden in a bus in Ahmedabad wounded 5. But the most 
spectacular operation took place the next day, on 24 September, in Gandhinagar, 
when two armed men entered the Akshardham Hindu temple, a huge complex that 
can accommodate up to 5,000 worshippers. With AK-56s they shot at everything 
that moved and launched grenades, killing 28 people. They holed up in the temple 
until a National Security Guard commando flushed them out the next morning. 
Three members of the police forces were killed in the siege.  
 Modi immediately declared that the terrorists were from Pakistan but the fact 
that it was an act of vengeance was made clear by the notes found in the two men's 
pockets, in which they claimed, in Urdu, to belong to a group called “Tehreek-e-
Kasas” (Movement for Revenge). Addressing “thousands of conscienceless 
                                                 
42 K.M. Chenoy et al., Gujarat Carnage 2002, op. cit., p. 5. 
43 N. Menon, “Surviving Gujarat,” e-mail communication. 
44 Ibid. 
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enemies of the Muslim of India,” they declared: “We will never rest in peace if we 
do not take revenge for the killings of our people.”  
 This act is indicative of the risk of escalation India faces today: if the Muslims 
continue to be subjected to abuse of the likes that occurred with the outbreak of 
violence in Gujarat in 2002, they may well increasingly resort to terrorism as a 
weapon of the weak – naturally with the support of Islamist fundamentalist groups, 
including those based in Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
